Microsoft 365 Token Theft: EvilTokens, Knight Office and Kali365

Huntress breakdown of EvilTokens, Knight Office and Kali365, three phishing kits built for Microsoft 365 token theft, and how MSPs can contain the damage.

Threat AdvisoryLast updated

What Happened

Huntress researchers broke down how three phishing kits, EvilTokens, Knight Office and Kali365, carry out Microsoft 365 token theft by capturing and replaying session tokens. BleepingComputer published the research on November 17, 2026.

The reporting is a technical breakdown of the kits and of how defenders can detect and contain these attacks. It does not describe a specific breach, name victims, or tie the kits to a named campaign.

For an MSP the point is blunt. A session token is a working login. In general, an attacker who holds one can use the session without knowing the password and without triggering the prompts users have been trained to watch for. That turns one bad click into mailbox access, file access and, often, a foothold the client will not spot on their own.

Timeline

The reporting gives no other dates. It does not say when these kits first appeared or when they were used.

  • November 17, 2026: BleepingComputer published a report on Huntress research detailing how EvilTokens, Knight Office and Kali365 capture and replay Microsoft 365 tokens, and how defenders can detect and contain these attacks.

Who Is Affected

The reporting names Microsoft 365 tokens as the affected asset. It does not name specific victims, industries, countries or counts.

In practice that reaches any organization whose staff sign in to Microsoft 365, including every client tenant an MSP supports. The kits target the sign-in step, so the exposure is not limited to one sector or one size of business.

Because the target is the user session rather than a server, the risk shows up as account takeover that looks like ordinary user activity. That is what makes it expensive: the damage is measured in mail read, invoices intercepted and files copied before anyone revokes the session.

Why Microsoft 365 Token Theft Is Hard to Spot

In general, token replay leaves fewer traces than password guessing. There are no repeated failed logins to alert on, because the attacker already holds a valid session.

What an analyst can look for is behavior after the sign-in. A new device or location, mail forwarding rules the user did not create, mailbox access from an unusual address, or a token issued to an application the client does not use. These are standing detection practices for this class of attack, not findings from this research.

Speed matters. In general, the longer a live session stays valid, the more an attacker can read, forward and delete. Revoking sessions and resetting credentials is the standard first containment step, and it is far cheaper than a rebuild after the fact.

Technical Details

No CVE identifier is given in the reporting. No software versions are named. The product named is Microsoft 365, and the attack vector as the sources state it is phishing kits that capture and replay Microsoft 365 tokens. The three kits named are EvilTokens, Knight Office and Kali365.

The reporting does not state that any of the kits have been used in a confirmed intrusion, and it gives no severity rating. Treat it as research into a technique, not a single product bug with a patch path.

What MSPs Should Do

These are the standard containment and hardening steps for a stolen session token. Nothing in this research changes them.

  1. Treat a stolen token as a live session. Revoke the account's active sessions and refresh tokens, then force a password reset.
  2. Review the sign-in logs for that account for new devices, unusual locations and unfamiliar applications.
  3. Hunt for persistence: mailbox rules, forwarding addresses, delegate permissions and application grants the user did not create. Remove what the user cannot explain.
  4. Move clients toward phishing-resistant MFA, such as passkeys or security keys, as a standing practice. Code-based prompts and push approvals are weaker against this class of attack.
  5. Tighten Conditional Access: require compliant or managed devices, restrict sign-ins by location where the business allows it, and block legacy authentication.
  6. Train users to report suspicious sign-in pages fast, and to reach Microsoft 365 only through a bookmark or a password manager that will not autofill on a lookalike domain.
  7. Keep a backup of Microsoft 365 data that is not reachable with the same credentials as the tenant, and test a restore rather than assuming it works.
  8. Write the first hour of a token theft response into your runbook so any technician on shift can execute it without waiting for the account owner.

How EnterProtect Helps

EnterProtect backup keeps clean, restorable copies of the Microsoft 365 data your clients depend on, held separately from the tenant itself.

If a client loses mail, files or whole mailboxes, EnterProtect recovery is what gets that client running again, on your schedule rather than the attacker's.

EnterProtect vulnerability scanning finds exposed versions across the environments you manage, so patchable problems stay on the schedule instead of surfacing during an incident.

None of that detects or blocks a phishing kit. Backup, recovery and scanning limit what a stolen session costs a client before and after the account is contained.

Frequently Asked Questions

What Are EvilTokens, Knight Office and Kali365?

They are three phishing kits that Huntress researchers detailed: EvilTokens, Knight Office and Kali365. The research breaks down how each kit captures and replays Microsoft 365 tokens. The same reporting also covers how defenders can detect and contain these attacks.

How Does a Microsoft 365 Token Get Stolen?

The reporting describes kits that capture and replay Microsoft 365 tokens. In general, that capture happens when a user is tricked into signing in on a page the attacker controls, and the stolen token is then replayed to reach the account. Because the token is already valid, the attacker does not need the password at that point.

Is There a CVE for These Phishing Kits?

No CVE identifier is named in the reporting, and no software versions are named either. The product named is Microsoft 365, and the attack vector as the sources state it is phishing kits that capture and replay Microsoft 365 tokens. There is no patch path attached to this research, because the exposure sits with the user session rather than with an unpatched server.

Can Multi-factor Authentication Stop a Stolen Microsoft 365 Token?

In general, token replay can satisfy authentication factors that rely on a password, a code or a push approval, because the attacker is holding a session that already passed those checks. Phishing-resistant methods such as passkeys or hardware security keys raise the bar. No single control closes the gap on its own, so detection after sign-in still matters.

What Should I Do First If a Client's Microsoft 365 Account Is Compromised?

Revoke the account's active sessions and refresh tokens, then force a password reset. Review recent sign-in activity for unfamiliar devices, locations and applications. Remove mailbox rules, forwarding addresses, delegate permissions and application grants that the user did not create.

Why Does Token Theft Matter so Much to an MSP?

An MSP holds sign-in access to many tenants, so one captured session in one client account can lead to mailbox access, file access and further phishing from a trusted address. In general, that kind of access is quiet, which means it can run for a while before anyone notices. Containment speed is what limits the cost.

Sources

  • Inside Modern Phishing Kits Built to Steal Microsoft 365 Sessions (Bleepingcomputer)

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